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Cooperation can benefit and hurt firms at the same time. An important question
then is: when is it better to cooperate. And how can an appropriate partner be
selected? In this paper we present a model of inter-firm cooperation driven by
cognitive distance, appropriability conditions and external knowledge. Absorptive
capacity of firms develops as an outcome of the interaction between absorptive R&D
and cognitive distance from voluntary and involuntary knowledge spillovers. Thus,
we offer a revision of the original model by Cohen and Levinthal (1989) accounting
for recent empirical findings and explicitly modeling absorptive capacity within the
framework of interactive learning. We apply that to the analysis of firms’ coopera-
tion and R&D investment preferences. While the focus of this paper is limited to
a static scenario, where the cognitive distance between cooperating firms is fixed
and given exogenously, in Savin and Egbetokun (2012) we address the dynamic ap-
proach and provide more extensive simulation results.
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1 Introduction
This paper presents a new theoretical model of absorptive capacity and cooperation
between firms. The aim is not to completely capture the motivations for cooperation;
rather, we focus on a very specific effect, that is, knowledge sharing or what De Bondt
(1996) termed the “voluntary exchange of useful technological information”. In this sense
our model shares the features of Cowan’s et al (2007) model of bilateral collaboration
where firms form alliances purely based on the production of shared knowledge.
Inter-firm cooperation for learning and innovation has become more common in re-
cent years, mainly due to rapid technological progress and changes in the business envi-
ronment. Quickly advancing technological knowledge and rising costs of R&D make it
virtually impossible for any firm to maintain in-house all the capabilities and knowledge
required for production. Moreover, increasing specialisation creates a situation where
firms occupy relatively narrow positions in the knowledge space. Consequently, firms of-
ten need knowledge1 that lies outside their core competence. The formation of alliances
with other organisations has proven to be an effective way to access external knowledge
to complement endogenous capabilities (Powell and Grodal, 2005; de Man and Duysters,
2005; Brusoni et al, 2001; Bamford and Ernst, 2002; Powell, 1998).
For such alliances to have the desired effects, firms require absorptive capacity to
understand and apply knowledge generated elsewhere. This capacity is developed by
investing in R&D (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989, henceforth CL).2 Moreover, the effective-
ness of alliances is known to have an inverted ‘U’-shaped relation with cognitive distance.
In alliance formation, therefore, firms need to balance between their technological hetero-
geneity and overlap with potential partners (Nooteboom, 1999). This creates a proximity
trade-off and has been a major focus in the recent literature.3
However, other issues are also important. Reciprocal terms of cooperation require a
firm to share some of its knowledge with the partner in order to gain access to the latter’s
knowledge base (Fehr and Gächter, 2000). This is like a ‘two-edged sword’; if the partner
can learn faster and is more capable to innovate, the firm then runs the risk of making its
partner better at its own expense. For this reason, voluntary spillovers or appropriability
conditions between cooperation partners become a very critical factor to consider in
cooperation. For the same reason, a firm will take the R&D efforts of its potential
partner seriously since that is the main source of absorptive capacity. When these are
combined with the challenge of cognitive distance, an important practical question arises:
when is it better for a firm to cooperate?
In this paper, we approach the question from a theoretical perspective by looking at
the contribution of absorptive capacity (driven by cognitive distance, appropriability con-
ditions and external knowledge) to firms’ R&D profit, and examine where a cooperating
1Henceforth, knowledge in this sense includes technologies that firms use in innovation. Inno-
vation refers to a technically new product which develops as an outcome of R&D (see Oslo man-
ual, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 2005). Consequently, by R&D
profit we imply profit due to innovation.
2Although recent studies have argued that absorptive capacity, being a multidimensional concept, is
not fully proxied by R&D or staff quality alone (Flatten et al, 2011; Zahra and George, 2002), we assume
that a significant portion of it is embodied in R&D performance. Therefore, our conceptualisation of
absorptive capacity in this paper derives mainly from a firm’s R&D investments.
3Some studies (e.g., Cantner and Meder, 2007; Mowery et al, 1996) have also shown that cognitive
proximity reduces over time. This affects the learning and innovation potential of an alliance and reduces
the likelihood that the same partners will cooperate in the next period. This dynamic is important and
we address it in a companion paper (Savin and Egbetokun, 2012).
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firm will outperform a non-cooperating one. To do this, we develop a model of inter-firm
cooperation in which partners increase their knowledge stock by sharing complementary
knowledge. The amount of external knowledge absorbed depends on absorptive capacity,
and the new knowledge affects firm performance through innovation-driven profit. Two
things set our model apart. First, a firm develops absorptive capacity not as a side-effect
of total R&D but by devoting a share of its total R&D budget explicitly to it. This
creates an investment trade-off. Second, accounting for cognitive distance allows us to
distinguish voluntary spillovers within an alliance from other forms of external knowledge.
With these elements, we are able to modify the original absorptive capacity model of CL
for the context of inter-firm alliances. We use that to study how cooperation affects firm
performance in terms of profit.
This study contributes to understanding cooperation and R&D investment prefer-
ences of companies and, therefore, has important theoretical and practical applications.
The theoretical predictions of our model are more relevant in the context of interactive
learning, and our comparative results offer some practical insight on alliance formation
decision-making. However, in this study our focus is limited to a static scenario (where
cognitive distance and absorptive capacity of firms are not affected by their past deci-
sions). In the companion paper (Savin and Egbetokun, 2012) we extend our model to
analyse the dynamic scenario in order to cover those issues.
2 Literature overview
Technological progress develops along certain trajectories within a given technological
paradigm. Each of these trajectories contains some technological opportunities which
are either intensive or extensive. In the former case, companies explore opportunities on
a particular trajectory by investing in own R&D. In the latter case, firms make use of
external knowledge generated by other firms. For this, however, at least a share of the
external knowledge must not be a private good (i.e., not appropriated by the owner).
The magnitude of this share depends on the effectiveness of the mechanisms by which
knowledge is protected - the appropriability conditions (Dosi, 1982). In the literature,
there is a long discussion on the tradeoff between knowledge spillovers and appropriability
conditions starting from Arrow (1962). It is argued that spillovers create a negative
appropriability incentive. Reducing the innovation rent, large spillover possibilities result
in lower (than optimal from a social point of view) level of R&D investments. However,
due to the heterogeneity of companies, knowledge transfer via these spillovers contributes
to technological progress and can be beneficial for recipient firms (de Fraja, 1993). Those
spillovers are nevertheless only effective if the recipient of knowledge has a sufficient
capacity to absorb it.
Absorptive capacity, that is the ability to value, assimilate and apply new knowledge,
was originally conceptualised by CL as a byproduct of a firm’s R&D efforts. By allowing
the firm to complement its own knowledge with incoming spillovers, this capacity en-
hances a firm’s problem-solving ability (Kim, 1998). Zahra and George (2002) extended
the concept of absorptive capacity by differentiating between potential and realised ab-
sorptive capacity. Potential absorptive capacity involves the acquisition and assimilation
of knowledge spillovers, while realised absorptive capacity guarantees the application of
this knowledge through the development and refinement of routines that facilitate its
transformation and exploitation.
3
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As already hinted, spillovers generally arise from two sources: public and private R&D.
Compared to public R&D, spillovers from private R&D are often not easily accessible.
Moreover, in the context of today’s rapidly changing and highly competitive business en-
vironment, spillovers from other firms’ R&D often provide more relevant complementary
resources. Firms often need to engage in cooperation with other firms to gain access to
such knowledge spillovers. In this context, both dimensions of absorptive capacity are at
work. Potential absorptive capacity helps the firm to identify an appropriate partner and
learn from it, while realised absorptive capacity enables the firm to deploy the knowledge
acquired in innovation which enhances profit. Indeed, recent empirical work on inter-
firm learning and alliances has shown that firms with higher absorptive capacity tend to
benefit more from external knowledge (e.g., de Jong and Freel, 2010; Lin et al, 2012).
When a firm engages in cooperation, in addition to involuntary spillovers from other
organisations it can also appropriate voluntary spillovers from its partners (Gulati, 1998).
But securing access to voluntary spillovers through partnerships has a potentially negative
side effect because of the reciprocity that characterises cooperative arrangements. The
(potential) partner’s stock of knowledge creates an incentive to cooperate with that part-
ner. But in exchange, it also needs to open up its own knowledge base (Fehr and Gächter,
2000). Consequently, spillovers from the firm’s R&D efforts do not only reduce its own
appropriation, they potentially improve its competitor’s R&D performance.4 This is a
‘cost of partnership’ which constitutes another form of the negative appropriability incen-
tive. This negative incentive is lowered because the partner firm does not possess perfect
absorptive capacity to appropriate all the spillovers (CL, p. 575-6; Hammerschmidt, 2009,
p.426). Thus, what a firm worries about is not necessarily the total spillovers it gener-
ates, but how much its partner can absorb, that is, the effective spillovers which increase
as the absorptive capacity of this (competing) partner increases.5 Moreover, the firm
also benefits from cooperation because it has access to a pool of knowledge larger than
just its own, particularly when the partner holds complementary technological knowledge
thereby creating a higher potential to innovate.
The relative value of knowledge spillovers can be represented by the distance between
partners.6 If the distance is small, companies well understand each other and there is
much less uncertainty (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998), but there might be no new knowledge
to learn and, hence, there is the risk of lock-in. In contrast, if the distance is large,
the knowledge has higher novelty but is too difficult to absorb and coordination prob-
lems may arise (Boschma, 2005). This leads to the optimal cognitive distance hypothesis
which has been the subject of many studies. The consensus in the empirical literature is
that technological or cognitive proximity between cooperation partners has an inverted
‘U’-shaped relation with the value of learning the partners obtain (or, alternatively, the
4This argument is important for our model and will be applied later in modeling the firm’s profit.
5In our model we are concerned with firms competing on the same technological trajectory. In the
extreme case that the cooperating partners operate in different industries, competition between them
is mostly negligible. In this case, spillovers do not constitute a disincentive to cooperation and R&D
investments (Cantner and Pyka, 1998, p. 374).
6Distance, in this sense, includes not only cognitive distance but also organisational, social, institu-
tional and geographical ones (Wuyts et al, 2005; Boschma, 2005). For instance, Dettmann and von Proff
(2010) demonstrated that organisational and institutional proximity facilitate long-distance collaboration
in patenting. Similarly, Wuyts et al (2005) demonstrated that, depending on the industry, organisational
and strategic proximity could be more important in the formation of alliances than the cognitive one.
Nevertheless, since our study is concerned with knowledge sharing, it is more appropriate to concentrate
on cognitive distance.
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innovative potential of the alliance) (Lin et al, 2012; Gilsing et al, 2008; Nooteboom et al,
2007; Wuyts et al, 2005; Mowery et al, 1998). An understandability–novelty trade-off ex-
ists such that effective learning by interaction is better accomplished by limiting cognitive
overlap while securing cognitive distance.
The discussion so far is based on a perception of absorptive capacity as a passive
by-product of R&D investments made to generate inventions. However, it can be ar-
gued that the allocation of R&D resources is not a simple and unidirectional decision.
A distinction can be made between absorptive R&D and inventive R&D. Absorptive
R&D refers to the investments made to benefit from knowledge spillovers while inven-
tive R&D is the effort made by a firm to generate original knowledge (Hammerschmidt,
2009; Cantner and Pyka, 1998). This distinction reflects the difference between “the ex-
ploration of new possibilities and the exploitation of old certainties” (March, 1991, p.
71)7 as well as the common classification of R&D into basic and applied research. As
Cassiman et al (2002) showed, by doing basic R&D a firm can effectively access incoming
knowledge spillovers which then help to increase the efficiency of own applied R&D.
In this sense, absorptive capacity is no longer a passive by-product of R&D, but an
explicit part of the firm’s strategy. This strategic necessity is even more important when
the external knowledge source (from which a firm desires to learn) is not close to its
prior knowledge. This is also true when the knowledge, such as that which comes from
universities and research institutes, is not directly applicable to the needs of the firm. In
this case, CL (p. 572) argue that a firm’s capacity to appropriate the knowledge increases
as the firm invests more in R&D. This argument is extended with the distinction between
inventive and absorptive R&D; it can now be noted that it is not routine R&D but explicit
investments in the form of absorptive R&D that facilitates the build-up of absorptive
capacity. At the same time, firms need to build up a certain level of capacity to generate
own knowledge through inventive R&D.8 Consequently, firms are faced with the strategic
decision of how to optimally allocate resources between inventive and absorptive R&D,
which, though complementary, are mutually exclusive. This constitutes an investment
trade-off that holds important implications for a firm’s learning abilities and cooperation
preferences.
Historically, modeling studies have treated the R&D investment and cooperation de-
cisions of firms only with respect to exogenous spillovers (see De Bondt, 1996, for an
overview). Typically, such spillovers, especially when they are symmetric, have a neg-
ative effect on strategic R&D investments. At the same time, they incentivise firms to
engage in cooperation and to make bilateral investment commitments. Later models
account for absorptive capacity and show that technological heterogeneity, as reflected
in relatively high (exogenous) spillover rates, incentivises the build-up of absorptive ca-
7Even in this framework the understandability–novelty trade-off exists. In the context of exploitation,
wherein firms are concerned with improving their performance along the same technological trajectory,
a high level of mutual understanding is required to reduce transaction costs (Drejer and Vindig, 2007;
Cantner and Meder, 2007). Notwithstanding, since technological opportunities within a certain trajec-
tory tend to decrease continuously according to Wolff’s law (Cantner and Pyka, 1998), firms seek for
more explorative or extensive opportunities, the aim of which is to generate novelty. Consequently,
increasing cognitive distance positively influences the value of interactive learning because it raises the
novelty value of technological opportunities as well as the possibility of novel combinations of comple-
mentary resources. This is, however, only possible as long as the partners are close enough to understand
each other.
8This is a mechanism that assures the presence of reciprocal incentives for cooperation
(Kamien and Zang, 2000; Wiethaus, 2005).
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pacity (Hammerschmidt, 2009). Even when spillovers are endogenous, as is the case in
the model of Cantner and Pyka (1998), adopting a strategy that allocates more resources
to absorptive R&D as spillovers increase tends to be a more profitable strategy when
compared with other strategies such as the one in which the firm concentrates purely on
invention. A limitation of these studies is their failure to account for strategic alliance
formation as a way for firms to access complementarities, pool knowledge resources or
innovate jointly.
In more recent models (Cowan et al, 2007; Baum et al, 2010), alliance formation is
driven by its probability to succeed in terms of knowledge generation and innovation, as
well as the proximity of the potential partner. Among other things, the studies demon-
strate that knowledge sharing is a major motivation for alliance formation. In particular,
even in the absence of any social capital considerations9, empirically founded network
characteristics such as repeated alliances, transitivity and clustering can be observed.
However, these models treat absorptive capacity as an exogenous parameter which is
similar for all firms in the network. Although our model shares some of their features, an
important contribution we make is that absorptive capacity is not modeled exogenously.
In contrast, it is endogenous and is influenced by the two trade-offs described earlier.
Ultimately, cooperation decision is driven by proximity considerations, endogenous ab-
sorptive capacity and the cost of partnership in terms of the knowledge spillovers that a
potential partner can absorb.
3 The Model
In the model, firms compete within a defined knowledge space. A firm seeks to maximize
its profit from generating innovations. It does this by developing absorptive capacity to
gain from knowledge spillovers while also maintaining own inventive R&D. Consequently,
the firm needs to decide how to allocate its R&D investments between own invention and
the development of absorptive capacity. Knowledge spillovers are generated voluntarily
through inter-firm cooperation and involuntarily. The decision on investment allocation
is affected by cognitive distance (from both types of spillovers); larger distances corre-
spond to higher resource heterogeneity or novelty potential but also to larger investments
required to absorb them. In the static scenario that we analyse in this paper, the dis-
tances are given exogenously.10 Each firm resolves the investment trade-off and makes a
cooperation decision. This decision is influenced by cognitive distance, R&D investments
and appropriability conditions. We are particularly interested in the conditions under
which cooperation is superior to non-cooperation. To study this, we compare the R&D
investments and profits for a cooperating and non-cooperating firm.
Some important assumptions are to be noted. Firstly, in making their cooperation
decisions, firms consider only their short term potential profits. This assumption reflects
firms’ behaviour when the frontier of knowledge is rapidly extending, in which case the
9This means that technological fit, rather than social capital factors like trustworthiness and embed-
dedness, is a major causal force behind alliance formation (Baum et al, 2010). Firms will select partners
from whom they can learn significantly and for specific (short-term) purposes. In this sense, multiple
partnerships may not be necessary and firms stop their partnership search once they find a technologically
fit partner.
10In a dynamic scenario, cognitive distance will change according to the innovation success of the firms.
This consideration is beyond the scope of the present paper, but is considered in the companion work
(Savin and Egbetokun, 2012).
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pressure to innovate quickly is high, or when productive activities require a rapidly ex-
panding knowledge base, in which case firms need to cooperate so as to gain access to
complementary knowledge (Cowan et al, 2007).
Secondly, firms only select one partner and conduct one R&D project at a given
period. This is a simplifying assumption that improves the tractability of the model,
allowing us to focus exclusively on knowledge sharing between unique pairs of firms, and
is computationally more feasible.
Thirdly, the reliability and trustworthiness of potential partners is not taken into
account in the selection of cooperation partners. This follows partly from the short-
termism with which firms approach partner selection. In addition, since the potential
partners both have reciprocal incentives for cooperation, their likelihood to misbehave is
significantly lower. Otherwise, firms can simply discontinue the partnership in the next
period preventing an access to their voluntary spillovers.
Finally, firms are assumed to have perfect information about the knowledge base of
other firms.11 This assumption appears to be rather strong and is in contrast with the
common perception that firms have imperfect information about partners’ knowledge and
motivations (Oxley, 1997). However, it finds justification in the fact that the capabilities
and strategic focus of potential partners can be easily assessed through massive informa-
tion that is freely available. For example, a firm’s patent portfolio (which can be freely
accessed online) contains significant information on its knowledge stock and market value
(Hall et al, 2005). Thus, patents constitute a comprehensive representation of the knowl-
edge space in an industry. Note also that investments in screening and understanding
this knowledge (e.g., by hiring patent lawyers) can be considered as a separate share of
a firm’s R&D budget, further justifying the distinction in R&D investments applied in
the model. In addition, there are several other channels through which reliable informa-
tion can be obtained, for example, scientific and technical articles, hiring, and informal
networks (see footnote 3 in Baum et al, 2010, for more details on this).
3.1 R&D investments
In accordance with CL, we consider R&D investments as an instrument to stimulate
absorptive capacity. However, we consider this capacity to be not a by-product of the
total R&D investments but of a separate share of it. Thus, we distinguish between
investments directly in R&D that exploit identified technological opportunities (rdii) and
investments for exploring the environment for technological development (acii), together
forming total R&D spending (RDi)
12:
RDi = rdii + acii = ρiRDi + (1− ρi)RDi. (1)
This investment tradeoff is shaped by learning incentives including the potential quantity
and complexity of external knowledge.
11This does not necessarily eliminate the risks associated with innovation. First, firms need to be able to
understand the available information, an endeavour which is by itself costly and risky. Then, innovation
is still uncertain and runs the risk of failing, irrespective of how well-informed a firm’s cooperation
decisions are.
12We abstract from production and the market by treating the R&D budget RDi as exogenous. In
this way, the focus of the model is narrowed to the firm’s investment decision, knowledge generation and
innovation.
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3.2 Knowledge generation
In line with CL, firm i’s stock of knowledge in period t (ki,t) is increased by a quantity
comprising the firm’s own direct investment in R&D and externally generated knowledge












where ξ ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter which defines the rate of return to inventive R&D, δn ∈
(0, 1) reflects the fraction of knowledge not appropriated by companies13 and aci,t ∈ (0, 1)
is the degree to which firm i can absorb external knowledge, i.e. absorptive capacity.
The summation term in (2) assumes no cooperation between firms, hence no voluntary
knowledge spillovers. All firms want to ensure that the value of δn is as low as possible.
However, within a cooperative context the situation is different. Besides involuntary














, 1 > δc > δn > 0
The term δc + δn reflects total spillovers available to a cooperating firm and is always
below 1. In a dyadic relationship, only one partner j is present, and it can be assumed




i + aci (δcrdij + ek) . (3)
As it was stated above, we assume that firms have a perfect knowledge about the
distances to their potential partners and about their R&D budgets. Now, since any
particular firm takes a decision on the investments in R&D based on the investment
decision of its potential partner, we assume that in any given period a firm considers the
investment decision of the partner to be the same as in the previous period:
Ei(ρj,t) = ρj,t−1. (4)
In this paper focusing on a static scenario, no interaction of firms is considered and the
equality in (4) translates into an assumption of perfect knowledge also wrt the partner’s
investment trade-off (i.e., Ei(ρj) = ρj).
15
13This fraction is determined by the appropriability conditions which include the patent system in a
particular industry and the efficacy of secrecy or other forms of protection of firm j’s internal knowledge
14This follows partly from our focus on dyadic partnerships. In this sense, knowledge spillovers from
other firms not in the dyad and from public organisations together constitute technological opportunities
for the dyad. Thus, the focus of our study is on voluntary spillovers while the involuntary ones are not
ignored.
15However, in the dynamic case (Savin and Egbetokun, 2012) (4) necessarily introduces some uncer-
tainty as the expectation of firm i will not necessarily coincide with the actual investment decision of
firm j, which is based on its expactation about firm’s i decision: Ei(ρj,t) 6= ρj = f(Ej(ρi,t)).
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External knowledge, ek, is set as the total inventive R&D investment of other compa-








Absorptive capacity (aci) is dependent on two variables: i) the distance (di·) between firm
i’s knowledge base and external knowledge available and ii) the investments in absorptive
capacity (acii) made by the firm. Cognitive distance dij is modeled as an Euclidian
distance between the stock of knowledge of the two partners i and j (νi. and νj.), which
are independently and randomly (uniform distribution) attributed to the firms over κ
types of knowledge from the interval [0, 1]:
dij =
√
(νi1 − νj1)2 + (νi2 − νj2)2. (6)
We take κ = 2 for a better visualization of results.16
As explained earlier, shared knowledge is the main motivation for alliance formation
between any two firms i and j. Following Wuyts et al (2005), this knowledge can be
represented as the mathematical product of its novelty value (which increases in cognitive
distance) and understandability (that respectively decreases in cognitive distance):
ani,j = (αdij)(β1 − β2dij) = αβ1dij − αβ2d2ij, (7)
And accounting for the stimulating role of investments in absorptive capacity (acii):
ani,j = αβ1dij(1 + aci
ψ
i )− αβ2d2ij = αβ1dij + αβ1dijaciψi − αβ2d2ij , (8)
where ψ ∈ (0, 1) reflects the efficiency of absorptive R&D. This investment essentially
causes an upward shift in understandability for any given dij and has decreasing marginal
returns. Since the aim of the firm is to maximise the knowledge it absorbs given its current
level of absorptive capacity, we proceed by considering absorptive capacity as a function
of the knowledge absorbed by i from cooperation with j. Specifically, it is presented as











]2 ∈ [0, 1] (9)




which corresponds with CL (p. 572).17 In contrast, the effect of dij on aci,j is ambigu-
16Here we consider this distance to be given exogenously and fixed over time. In a separate dynamic
analysis we allow the distance to vary depending on cooperation intensity.
17Note that while cognitive distance is symmetric (i.e. dij = dji), ani,j and aci,j are asymmetric. This
is because the investment trade-off is not solved by the two companies identically (i.e. absorptive R&D
investments are not necessarily the same for the two companies).
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ous: for a given value of acii, it is positive (
∂aci,j
∂dij




< 0) until a certain
optimal distance is reached and negative (∂aci
∂dij
< 0) otherwise (Figure 1). The maxi-
mum of the inverted ‘U’-shaped function shifts right (left) with increasing (decreasing)
acii (Figure 2), allowing a firm to adopt its absorptive capacity to the actual distance
from its cooperation partner. The latter characteristic corresponds to the empirical fact
that investments in absorptive capacity raise the optimal distance between cooperation































Figure 2: Dynamics in absorptive capacity function
Note: As company i increases its investments in absorptive capacity (acii), the optimal distance to its cooperating partner
increases. Thus, for the larger distance, i has a higher absorptive capacity by increasing its investments (left plot). The
opposite is true for the lower distance (right plot).
It is clear from (9) that when di. = 0 absorptive capacity equals zero. This is because
if there is no difference between firm i’s own knowledge and the external one, the novelty
value is zero even if understandability is maximal. In this way, absorptive capacity (aci,.)
is modeled explicitly at the level of interactive learning;18 and it captures not only the
ability to understand external knowledge, but also the ability to explore the environment
and to identify novel knowledge.
It should be noted that the cognitive distance of firm i from from external knowledge
ek (i.e. diek) is not necessarily the same as that from firm j (i.e. dij). In this study we
consider it as the average distance to all other firms in the knowledge space:
18This is similar to the conceptutalisation by Lane and Lubatkin (1998) of absorptive capacity as ‘a
learning dyad-level construct’.
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so that the maximum distance to the external knowledge does not exceed the maximum
distance to a single potential partner in this space. Thus, for the same level of absorptive
R&D, the absorptive capacity directed on each of the two sources of spillovers will be
different.19 When this is accounted for, (3) transforms into:
ki = rdi
ξ
i + aci,j (δcrdij) + aci,ek (ek) . (11)
Without an R&D partner, the knowledge to be generated by firm i is different (ek is the
only source of external knowledge):
kgenerated alonei = rdi
ξ
i + aci,ek (ek) as δc = 0. (12)
3.4 Innovation and profit
Innovation is perceived as a process which involves recombination of heterogeneous re-
sources. Thus, the size of a potential innovation (if it is successful) is defined by the
amount of knowledge (ki) generated. The profit (Πi) realised by the firm is dependent
on the probability to innovate (Θ). This probability is treated as exogenous and re-
flects the uncertainty of the innovation process (Dosi, 1988; Utterback and Abernathy,
1975).20 When the firm does not form a partnership, its profit is not affected by volun-
tary spillovers. In a partnership, however, the profit of the firm decreases proportionally
with the amount of knowledge spillovers (acj,iδcrdii) that the partner can absorb (which
is essentially a constituent part of kj that reduces the appropriability of ki). This is
in contrast to CL where Πi is reduced proportional to the knowledge generated by the
partner (kj).
21 This ‘cost of partnership’ or, in the words of CL, ‘effect of rivalry’ affects
the choice of an R&D partner. To avoid the problem of increasing Πi for acj,iδcrdii < 1,





if i has a partner j,
Θkgenerated alonei if i has no partner.
(13)
One way of interpreting the profit function in case of partnership in (13) is a split of
property rights over a certain invention (new technology) converted into a monetary value.
Since this technology may be used in different applications, the split is not necessarily
exact; however, appropriation of rights over the invention is reduced by the amount of
spillovers to a competing partner. Thus, the form of the function suggested can have a
meaningful (although not necessarily exclusive) economic interpretation and also follow
the assumptions on the functional form from CL (see above).
19As in (9), aci,ek = f(diek).
20For example, this probability of innovation success can be considered binary with a lognormal dis-
tribution Θ ∼ lnN (µ, σ2) to ensure the event of innovation in any given period to be low (e.g., one
innovation at any given period at maximum).
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4 Optimal decision making
In the following we discuss the optimal strategy of firm i in i) solving the investment trade-
off and ii) forming a partnership. Our interest is in how absorptive capacity (derived from
R&D resource allocation, ρi), cognitive distance (dij), appropriability conditions (δc) and
technological opportunities (ek) affect the benefits from cooperation. To study this, we
resolve the investment trade-off for a representative firms in two scenarios (cooperative
and non-cooperative) and compare the results in terms of innovative profit.
4.1 Investment trade-off
For certain levels of the distance dij that maximises understandability and novelty, firm
i is incentivised to invest in absorptive R&D to maximise the amount of external knowl-
edge absorbed. The trade-off that the firm faces is how to optimally distribute its total
R&D investment between the creation of own knowledge and the improvement of ab-
sorptive capacity. This necessitates a comparison of the marginal returns to each type of
investment with respect to the profit gained. Absorptive R&D begins to pay off when it







Using (13), (12), (11), (9) and (1), we obtain (see Appendix 1 for derivation) the
condition for the R&D investment that satisfies (14):
{
F(ρi) = 0 if i has a partner j,
Fa(ρi) = 0 if i has no partner.
(15)
As (15) is a highly complex non-linear function with multiple local minima depending
on the particular set of parameter values applied, it is a non-trivial problem to find the
value of ρi satisfying the condition.
22 For this reason we apply a heuristic optimisation
technique, in particular, Differential Evolution that is able to identify a good approxima-
tion of the global optimum in (15) for different sets of calibrating parameters as long as
they satisfy the conditions stated above (see Appendix 2 for details).
4.2 Partnership formation
Since larger distances (until a certain optimum level) increase the marginal returns to
new knowledge generated, it follows that each firm prefers to select a cooperation partner
at the largest distance possible to maximise the novelty value of the R&D cooperation.
At the same time, the partner choice is essentially constrained by understandability such
that the firm i chooses a partner which it can also understand. In addition, the firm also
takes into account the costs of partnership as a result of spillovers from its R&D efforts.
Ultimately, the decision to cooperate (or not) is a profit-maximising one which depends
22A deterministic iterative solution (e.g., according to the fixed-point theorem) is also not applicable
as the function does not necessarily always converge to a ρi ∈ [0, 1] for all possible combinations of
parameters.
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on the potential profit generated when working alone in comparison with profit generated
by cooperating with the most ‘fitting’ partner:
max
(
Πgenerated alonei ; Π




To this end, the simulation in the basic case can proceed as follows. First, all ex-
ogenous parameters (α, β1, β2, ψ, ξ, η, γ, ρj, δc, ek (the latter three variables can be
simulated with different scenarios)) must be set.23 This also includes a random distribu-
tion of the initial stocks of knowledge (⇒ set dij) and aggregated R&D budgets (RD)
for all firms.
Second, in each period one needs to solve the investment trade-off of each company
(ρ.) for all potential partners, considering the expectation about other firms’ invest-
ments in R&D to be known. After that, the amount of knowledge k. to be generated by
each company either alone (standalone mode) or in partnership with any of the firms
in the knowledge space is estimated. Based on this information the most lucrative
partner for each company can be selected by maximizing profit from R&D activity Πi:
max(Πalonei ,Π
j




Third, although the most lucrative partner for each firm is identified, partnership
formation is a non-trivial task in this model. The reason is that the incentives of a
firm i to build a partnership with firm j are asymmetric: although distance between
the partners is the same, the decision on the investment trade-off in R&D is individual
for each company. Hence, there is no ‘Nash stable network’ 24. So far, we consider few
alternatives on forming partnerships:
• A rule of thumb: if firm i identifies firm j as the most lucrative cooperation part-
ner and is itself among the ‘top’ 10% of the companies with whom firm j would
cooperate, then they build a partnership. The main advantage of the method is its
simplicity and low computational time required.
• A ‘popularity contest’ : one counts for how many firms each company is the most
lucrative one, the second most lucrative one, . . . . After that the firms are ranked
according their popularity and choose themselves a partner in the order of this
ranking. Computational cost of this approach is slightly higher, but the sceanario
may be considered as a more realistic one.
• An algorithmic search: first, we exclude all firms out of the further search, which
in any case prefer ’standing alone’ (no cooperation); then we randomly select a
company i out of the population and identify its most lucrative partner j. If for j it
is the same (i.e., i is the most lucrative), they form a partnership and are excluded
from further search. If it is not the case, we continue with j searching for its most
23For illustrative reasons we take a single set of parameter values for two firms satisfying their con-




2, β2 = 1, ψ = 0.3, ξ = 0.5, RDi = RDj = 4, δc = 0.75,
ek = 1, ρj = 0.5 and diek =
√
2/1.01. These values were chosen to demonstrate on a single set of graphs
the complex shape of the ρ and Π functions in response to changes in the variables of interest.
24‘a stable network is one in which for each agent (or pair of agents) there is a payoff maximizing
decision about which link to form’ (Cowan et al, 2007, p. 1052)
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lucrative partner. If the search path becomes cyclical (i→ j → k → i...), we exclude
the entire cycle (none of the firms builds a partnership) and continue the random
search. Computational time in this case is the highest (increases exponentially
with the number of firms in the population), but may be also argued as a realistic
scenario of partnership formation.
It remains for simulation experiments to decide which of the scenarios described fits
best. After that the companies’ profits based on realised innovation success (Θ) can be
estimated. The algorithm may run from 1 to T periods. Since in the static scenario only
exogenous parameters may change from period to period (distances in the knowledge
space are not recalculated), the extensive simulation is left for the dynamic approach
described in the companion paper of this study (Savin and Egbetokun, 2012). In the
following, only some illustrative results for one firm in two scenarios (cooperative and
non-cooperative) are demonstrated.
4.3 Comparative statics
In CL, absorbed external knowledge is endogenous and influenced by R&D investments,
which is itself affected by the ease of learning, intra-industry spillovers and technological
opportunities.25 The effects of the latter group of parameters are similar for both R&D
investment and the payoff it generates for the firm. However, the extensions we make
in our study imply different results. First, the distinction between absorptive (acii)
and inventive (rdii) R&D implies that the learning effects of R&D are only driven by
investments in absorptive R&D. Second, explicitly accounting for voluntary spillovers
implies that reciprocal incentives are involved. Thus, besides its own resource allocation
problem, firm i takes into account the investment decisions of the potential partner firm
j.
Moreover, in contrast to CL, we model in the context of inter-firm cooperation and so
we concentrate on innovation-driven profit and cooperation decision rather than just on
R&D investments. As it is clear from comparing (1) and (13), the parameter effects on
the firm’s R&D investments (∂RDi/∂·) and its payoff in terms of profit (∂Πi/∂·) are not
necessarily similar. In Table 1 we summarise our results in comparison to CL26 focusing
on the latter group of effects (as the R&D profit presents the main motivation for firms
to engage in cooperation in our study), while Figure 3 illustrates them in detail for the
cooperating and non-cooperating scenarios.
25For the sake of comparison, CL’s ease of learning is analogous to our cognitive distance construct,
intra-industry spillovers - to appropriability conditions and technological opportunities - to total external
knowledge.
26Note that by construction, in CL firm i’s marginal returns to R&D have the same effect on marginal
returns generated by the firm in terms of profit.
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Table 1: Comparative static results






As seen from the bottom leftmost plot in Figure 3, the cognitive distance dij between
cooperating partners has an ambiguous effect on R&D profits. A small distance (which
does not require absorptive investments) positively affects R&D profit. This is because
the firm can dedicate most of its R&D budget to invention and it suffers little or no
negative appropriation in return (top leftmost plot). However, as distance increases
the firm has to invest in absorptive capacity to maintain its gain from the partner’s
knowledge. This causes a reduction in inventive R&D, and by implication, in R&D profit
since the cost of partnership in terms of spillovers also increase. At a very large distance,
an ’understandability problem’ arises such that the new knowledge cannot be absorbed
as efficiently any longer and firm i cannot compensate it with sufficient investments in
absorptive capacity. As a result, the firm may shift some of its resources back to inventive
R&D.
Taken together, these results imply that firms choose a cooperation partner conditional
on the investments they are ready to make in order to establish efficient collaboration.
And in contrast to CL, where the ease of learning has a strictly positive effect on R&D
investments and profit when cooperation is not accounted for, the effect of cognitive
distance on profit has an inverted ‘U’ shape in the context of cooperation. In comparison,
with the same set of parameters one can conclude that the standalone strategy is more
lucrative when the distance to a potential partner is either too large (understandability
problem) or too small (no novelty).
4.3.2 Appropriability conditions and external knowledge
With regard to both δc and ek, the situation is different. ∂ki/∂δc and ∂ki/∂ek are strictly
positive suggesting that the appropriability conditions in a cooperative setting (δc) as well
as the amount of external knowledge (ek) raise the ability of the firm i to create new
knowledge from external sources. Consequently, firm i is incentivised to reallocate its
investments from inventive to absorptive R&D. More resources are devoted to absorptive
capacity which generally results in a higher level of new knowledge (ki) generated from
the cooperation. However, in contrast to ek (which has a strictly positive effect on R&D
profit), δc also contributes to the spillovers the cooperating partner can potentially absorb
from i, reducing its R&D profit. Thus, starting from a certain level, firm i’s losses from
a larger δc can exceed its benefits. This ambiguous inverted ‘U’-shaped relation of Πi
to δc is necessarily affected by the absorptive R&D budget of the partner: if it is small
enough, firm i can benefit from intensive cooperation not being afraid that its partner
absorbs much.
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Figure 3: Comparative statics for the investments (ρi) and profits (Πi) of firms
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This particular result contrasts with CL where the effect of appropriability conditions
is modified by the ease of learning. In our model, the effect of cognitive distance in this
respect is captured in absorptive capacity which has the inverted ‘U’-shaped form rep-
resenting the understandability/novelty trade-off. With a very large cognitive distance
the appropriability conditions may not matter at all as the partners have difficulties
understanding each other. Again, in comparison, we find that the non-cooperative strat-
egy is more lucrative when the cooperation intensity is either too large (threat of large
spillovers) or too small (the additional external knowledge is too small to invest in it).
Since technological opportunities are equally available for both cooperating and non-
cooperating firms, R&D profit in relation to ek is only dependent on the firm’s absorptive
capacity (see equation (12)); and it varies due to the different number of factors involved -
for the cooperating and non-cooperating scenarios - in the firm’s optimal decision making
(see Appendix 1).
4.3.3 R&D investments and absorptive capacity
Finally, the investment decision of the partner ρj has an ambiguous effect on firm i’s
investment allocation, but not on its profit (where it is strictly positive). This is because
as ρj increases, it contributes to the pool of external knowledge i can benefit from.
This creates an incentive to increase investments in absorptive capacity. However, for ρj
reaching its maximum values (close to 1) the cooperating partner lowers its absorptive
capacity to a very small extent. Thus, knowledge spillovers from firm i to firm j that can
be absorbed do not present a big threat for firm i’s inventive R&D any longer leading to a
large change in the firm’s investment allocation and, subsequently, its R&D profit. Hence,
the non-cooperative strategy is more lucrative only when the partner mostly invests in
absorbing knowledge and not in its generation (‘free rider’ problem).
5 Conclusion
In this paper we set out to model absorptive capacity within the framework of inter-firm
cooperation such that the capacity of a firm to appropriate external knowledge is not only
a function of its R&D efforts but also of the distance from its partner. This framework
allows us to account for recent empirical observations and to examine factors affecting
the choice of a firm on whether to engage in R&D cooperation or not. Our analysis is
concentrated on cognitive distance though other kinds of distance are also important. In
this paper we analyse the static case, where the cognitive distance between cooperating
firms is fixed and given exogenously, while the dynamic approach, where distance varies as
a function of the intensity of cooperation between partners, is considered in a companion
paper (Savin and Egbetokun, 2012).27
Comparing the results obtained with the original model of Cohen and Levinthal (1989)
shows some clear differences. First of all, the cognitive distance between a firm and its
cooperation partner has an ambiguous effect on the profit generated by the firm. Thus,
a firm chooses its cooperation partner conditional on the investments in absorptive ca-
pacity it is willing to make to solve the understandability/novelty trade-off. Hence, firms
27In the dynamic case, it is expected that a firm will reconsider its cooperation decisions depending
on cognitive distance. Alliances may be discontinued when partners become too close and previously
discontinued alliances may be re-formed if the partners have become sufficiently distant in terms of their
knowledge endowment. A simulation experiment to demonstrate this dynamics is in progress.
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possessing a larger R&D budget have a possibility to engage in cooperation with firms
located further away in terms of cognitive distance. If the partner is too close or too far,
no efficient colloboration can be established.
Next, though appropriability conditions in the framework of cooperation also have an
ambiguous effect on profits, this effect does not necessarily become greater (positive) with
a larger cognitive distance as in CL.28 At a very large cognitive distance the appropriabil-
ity conditions may not matter at all as the partners cannot understand each other. In
contrast, the question is: how large is the partner’s absorptive capacity? In our formula-
tion, absorptive capacity is a more complex construct presenting the interaction between
a firm’s absorptive R&D and cognitive distance. The larger the partner’s absorptive
capacity, the larger the portion of knowledge spillovers that this partner can assimilate.
This complex ambiguity, from our view, partly explains the caution that firms have in
engaging in R&D cooperation and the very detailed contracts related to the respective
agreements (see, e.g., Atallah (2003)).
Finally, external knowledge, that is knowledge available outside the framework of
cooperation, as well as the partner’s inventive R&D investments have positive effects on
the R&D profit. While the latter distinguishes our model from CL (where such a variable
is not explicitly considered), the former demonstrates an effect that somehow contradicts
CL. The reason is that according to CL where R&D investments are considered as one
expense item, external knowledge reduces incentives to own R&D on the one hand, but
incentivises investments for absorptive capacity on the other hand. Since we distinguish
between inventive and absorptive R&D, the dynamics from CL is contained in the upper
rightmost plot in Figure 3 (i.e. reaction in investment allocation), while the total effect
on the R&D profit is strictly positive. Also it is clear that the knowledge about the
partner’s R&D investment allocation presents an important asset for any firm in our
model. Ability to foresee this split allows a company to avoid opportunistic behaviour
from potential partners (i.e. ‘free riders’ with low inventive R&D) and better resolve the
two trade-offs in their decision making (optimal cognitive distance and optimal split of
investments). For an explicit account of uncertainty about this information as well as for
more simulation results, see Savin and Egbetokun (2012).
Appendix 1
Resolving the investment trade-off (equation 14) to find ρi







Recall from (13) that in case of a partnership, where i needs to optimise its investment





28In CL the effect of appropriability conditions is modified by the ease of learning.
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where Ei(ρj,t) = ρj,t−1 ⇒ ∂acj,i∂rdii = 0 and rdi = RDi − acii ⇒
∂rdii
acii
= −1. Next we set
(17) equal to (18) as in equation (14):





























Accounting for the difference in dij and diek in aci,· (9) we obtain the derivative of the






























































]2 as dij = dji. (23)
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Recall from (1) that rdii = ρiRDi and acii = (1−ρi)RDi; when this is applied to equation





β1 + β1 ((1− ρj)RDj)ψ − β2dij
)(





















































β1 + β1 ((1− ρj)RDj)ψ − β2dij
) . (25)
Shifting ρi from the left hand side to the right one, one gets F(ρi) = 0.
Remembering that for firm i performing R&D activity without a partner δc = 0, it is
straightforward to show that for this firm (25) takes a simpler form as follows:
F a(ρi) = ek
4β2ψdiek((1− ρi)RDi)ψ−1
β1(1 + ((1− ρi)RDi)ψ)2
(
2β2diek




− ξ (ρiRDi)ξ−1 = 0. (26)
20
Jena Economic Research Papers 2012 - 056
Appendix 2
Finding optimal solution for F (ρi) and F
a(ρi) using heuristics
Thanks to the recent advances in computing technology, new nature-inspired optimization
methods (called heuristics) tackling complex combinatorial optimization problems and de-
tecting global optima of various objective functions have become available (Gilli and Winker,
2009). Differential Evolution (DE), proposed by Storn and Price (1997), is a population
based optimization technique for continuous objective functions. In short, starting with
an initial population of solutions, DE updates this population by linear combination and
crossover of four different solutions into one, and selects the fittest ones among the orig-
inal and the updated population. This continues until some stopping criterion is met.
Algorithm 1 provides a pseudocode of the DE implementation.
Algorithm 1 Pseudocode for Differential Evolution
1: Initialize parameters p, F and Ω
2: Randomly initialize P
(1)
i ∈ Ω, i = 1, · · · , p
3: while the stopping criterion is not met do
4: P (0) = P (1)
5: for i = 1 to p do





r1 + F × (P (0)r2 - P (0)r3 )
8: if P
(υ)
i ∈ Ω then P (n)i = P (υ)i else repair P (υ)i
9: if F (P
(n)
i ) < F (P
(0)











In contrast to other DE applications to optimization problems (as described in, for
example, Blüschke et al, 2012), our solution is represented by a single value within [0, 1]
according to (1). Therefore, DE starts with a population of size p of random values
drawn from [0, 1] (Ω) (2:). For the same reason, current DE implementation has no need
in the crossover operator (otherwise, one would have to compare F (P
(0)
i ) with itself and
potentially waste computational time). Tuning our DE code we set p = 30, F = 0.8 and
as a stopping criterion we choose a combination of two conditions: either a maximum
number of generations is reached (which is set to be equal 5029) or the global optimum
is identified (F (P
(1)
i ) = 0). To make sure that our candidate solutions constructed by
linear combination (7:) satisfy our constraint on ρi, we explicitly check it in (8:) - and
if it is not met we ‘repair’ it by adding/deducting one unit - before comparing its fitness
with the current solutions in (9:).
As an illustration of the DE convergence for the tuning parameters stated consider
Figure 4 below. On the left plot one can see F (ρi) simulated for different ρi ∈ [0, 1], while
on the right plot the cumulative density function of F (ρi) for 100 restarts and different
number of maximum generations g (10, 30 and 50) is given. Obviously, with g = 50 DE
converges to zero (or a very close approximation of it) in almost 100% of restarts. To
ensure a good solution, therefore, we take g = 30 and restart DE three times. Using
Matlab 7.11 on Pentium IV 3.3 GHz a single DE restart with thirty generations requires
about 0.02 second.
29At this point DE population always converges to very similar values
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Figure 4: F (ρi) simulated for different ρi and empirical distribution of F (ρi) for different
g
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